Review: John Williamson

Here is a review of How Asia Works from the blog of John Williamson, the man who coined the phrase ‘Washington Consensus’.

It is a thoughtful review to which I offer three brief points of response, whose relevance should become apparent as you read: a) I believe that Thailand’s very fast growth in the 1980s was based too much on a surge of FDI in low-value added processing activity and speculative real estate development and that this is why it proved to be unsustainable; I also think that far too much of Thailand’s manufacturing activity since the Asian crisis is still based on FDI and that this is one reason why the country will not progress towards developed nation status. b) since indigenous technological progress in manufacturing has characterised all the economic development success stories I have studied, I am unwilling to suggest to poor countries that there is ‘another way’, as Mr Williamson suggests there may be; such advice reminds me of the IMF telling poor countries in east Asia in the 1970s and 1980s to get rid of capital controls at an early stage of development despite the fact that no successfully developed country (outside offshore centres) ever did so; I am, if anything, a historian and so I go with what has been shown to work. c) I cannot see how I suggested in the book that Mr Williamson was personally in favour of open capital accounts in developing countries; I am quite sure he is sick to death of ‘Washington Consensus’ being misused, but I don’t think I said anything about how his personal views do or do not differ from the Consensus view.

Review of Joe Studwell, How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region

Posted on August 22, 2013by 

In this book, the author lays out what he takes to be the conditions for catch-up growth à la Gerschenkron. These are essentially three. The first is land reform: letting the peasants own their own land and supporting this by the necessary ancillary services will result in maximizing output per hectare (and the labor input), with consequences that include a burst of output, increased savings, the creation of rural markets for urban-produced goods, without jeopardizing a ready-made supply of labor for the new urban industries. The second is the development of an industrial sector under heavy infant-industry protection, disciplined by the requirement of export success, and its progressive expansion into ever more advanced fields. The third is the use of a repressed financial system under government control in order to promote the first two conditions. He argues that this was the formula first pioneered by Meiji Japan and subsequently copied elsewhere in N.E. Asia (postwar Japan followed by Korea and Taiwan, and he hopes now China).

He also considers Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (S.E. Asia), and dismisses claims that they have enjoyed comparable success. They failed to implement a serous land reform, nor did any of them institute an industrial policy aimed at growing industry and pushing it into ever more advanced fields. Entrepreneurs were not required to assist in “developmental” causes when privileges were extended to them, nor were the privileges dependent on revealed success, e.g. in exporting. Accordingly they have no chance of becoming developed.

Of course, countries are required to lie through their teeth in order to implement his strategy. His hero is Park Cheung-hee, who was prepared to assure the Americans that he was aiming to enhance free markets at the same time that he actually did the opposite. But Studwell admits that there is a problem with his prescriptions, which are aimed at development. For an advanced economy, it is quite appropriate to pursue efficiency. The problem is in knowing when to switch from caring for development to pursuing efficiency. Korea accidentally made the switch right, at the time of the Korean crisis in 1997, when its policies were fortuitously controlled by the IMF. Japan failed to make the switch, as a result of which it has suffered 2 lost decades.

One suspects that there may be other problems with his prescriptions besides the self-diagnosed one. Before elaborating on these, let me say what a pleasure it was to read a literate defense of land reform again, emphasizing the importance of accompanying land reform by the provision of extension services, credit, marketing, etc. This is a reform that we have almost forgotten about in recent years, yet it is surely of vital importance. The problem is that it involves destroying some people’s property rights, unless full compensation is paid, which tends to be expensive. That is why historically major land reforms have occurred only in the wake of major wars, when the rulers had no qualms about raiding people’s property rights, since these were widely regarded as having been illegitimately acquired. My guess is that under current conditions it would be worth compensating fully, even though this would add to government debt. (A compromise is available to countries that have previously imposed a land tax: pay compensation at the declared value of land, which is usually a gross under-estimate of its actual value.)

It is also a pleasure to have the logic of the industrial policies pursued in NE Asia laid out so clearly, though I am not filled with the same zeal for them as for the agricultural policies. Buying them essentially requires a similar act of faith to that involved in signing on to the neoclassical economics he so fervently despises, and accepting that there is no other way to develop except by the dirigiste strategy that he so well outlines. But is that really true? When I was young the developed countries comprised Western Europe and what Angus Maddison has called the “European offshoots”. To those we must now add not only Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, but also Southern Europe, Israel, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

It is difficult to know what Studwell would make of Southern Europe (at least outside Italy, which he considers to have developed properly) and Israel. But Studwell tells us quite explicitly that he is not going to consider Hong Kong and Singapore, because they are merely “anomalous port financial havens” (p. 63). The implication is that it is wrong to compare city-states to “real” countries. This would make sense if the cities normally sacrificed for the benefit of their hinterland, but surely they have, on the contrary, generally exploited their hinterlands, so that it is more and not less difficult for a city-state to develop. Of course, addition of Hong Kong and Singapore to the comparators is devastating to his thesis. Hong Kong developed under the purest laissez-faire that I know of; its addition to the list of comparators suggests that we look to what the countries of NE Asia have in common—competitive exchange rates, reputable educational systems, demographic transitions, and high savings—rather than to what is different between them—industrial policy—in explaining their success. And the inclusion of Singapore in the reference set would force him to admit that part of SE Asia has already made it.

His attitude to SE Asia is in fact something of a mystery. He says on p.160 that it is difficult for him to see how any of the Asian stock markets contributed to development. Let me tell him: by letting firms raise money, and without the danger of strangling themselves by excessive leverage. On p. 166 he tells us that Thailand had been going completely the wrong way prior to 1997, but two pages before that he told us that Thailand was the world’s fastest developing country over the decade 1987-96. He added that this did not signify real development. In the sense in which he defines real development, as implying mastery of more advanced techniques, this may be right, but it makes one wonder about his definition. If there are alternative paths to advanced-country living standards that maybe involve less sacrifice of the current generation, why not take them?

Let us suppose for the sake of the argument that Studwell is correct in his description of how NE Asia developed. (I have a feeling that he is closer to the truth than all those who tried to make out that they succeeded because they were really paragons of liberal virtue.) At the same time, he does not convince me that this is the only route to development. What stands out from his description is the price that was paid for developmental success: he records how Korean businessmen were at one stage locked up (p. 89); foreign holidays by Koreans were banned as late as the 1980s (p. 149); the high rates of inflation that were endured by Koreans right up to the 1980s; the negative real rates of interest paid on Korean deposits and even in the kerb market when there was a crisis (p. 149); and so on. (Not to mention the deprivations experienced by Chinese consumers as the counterpart to the massive accumulation of reserves—reserves that will have a negative yield—by the People’s Bank of China.) Surely development à la NE Asia works, but it works at a terrible cost to the first (and maybe second) generations. If (as I argue above) there are alternative routes to high-income status and these alternatives demand fewer sacrifices en route, then one has to judge the demand that countries master ever more advanced techniques as quixotic.

Another paper that I read (in Portuguese) simultaneously with this book calculates the expected proportion of GDP contributed by industry over the period 2001-07, the expected proportion being determined by a regression equation containing per capita income, its square, population, and population density (Bonelli, Pessoa, and Matos 2013). An extract of their results shows:

Observed value         Lower limit     Expected value      Upper limit

Brazil                          0.15                      0.16                      0.18                      0.20

China                          0.32                      0.22                     0.28                      0.33

Germany                    0.21                      0.16                      0.19                      0.21

India                           0.15                      0.18                      0.22                      0.26

Japan                          0.21                      0.19                      0.21                      0.24

Korea                          0.24                      0.20                     0.22                     0.24

Thailand                     0.34                      0.17                      0.20                     0.23

UK                               0.13                      0.13                      0.16                      0.19

US                               0.14                      0.10                      0.14                      0.17

None of the NE Asian countries, nor Germany for that matter, are shown as falling significantly above the expected proportion of income. Ironically, the one country exhibiting clear signs of what they dub the “Soviet disease” (the opposite to the famous Dutch disease) is Thailand. Ah, but doubtless Studwell would fault them for having the wrong type of industry!

Let me note in closing that Studwell uses the term “Washington Consensus” with great frequency and always in what I think of as the populist sense. In n.3 he asserts, quite wrongly, that in introducing the term I favored floating exchange rates and unrestricted capital mobility: in fact I was quite explicit in condemning both. It is this that distinguishes the populist sense of the term (“populist” because it is used to signify policies that would discredit it in the minds of the audiences addressed) from my initial usage.

To return to the main theme, I welcome, though without much hope of his making an impact, the emphasis on land reform. But to assert that real development consists only of the process of mastering ever more advanced industrial techniques condemns most countries to remaining undeveloped. It has still to be proved that most countries cannot aspire to developed-country living standards without mastering the most advanced techniques. Unless this happens to be true, the notion of having a separate economics of development and then changing over to a concern with efficiency at some point in time, makes no sense.

References

Bonelli, Regis, Samuel Pessoa, and Silvia Matos. 2013. “Desindustrialzação no Brasil: fatos e interpretação”, in E. Bacha and M. Baugareten, eds., O Futuro da Indústria no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio Ltda).

Studwell, Joe. 2013. How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region. (New York: Grove Press.)

Asian Review of Books

An Interview with Joe Studwell, author of How Asia Works

by Caitlin Dwyer

How Asia Works; Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region

Joe Studwell

Profile Books Ltd, March 2013

 

3 July 2013 — Joe Studwell has written about Asia and economics for a variety of publications. Founding editor of China Economic Quarterly, he is also the author of three books: The China Dream, Asian Godfathers, and his most recent, How Asia Works.

How Asia Works seeks to debunk the classical rationale for why some Asian countries have flourished economically and others not. Three factors—agriculture, manufacturing, and finance—need supportive government policy to encourage development, Studwell posits. Using examples from Malaysia, Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines, Studwell shows that the economics of developing nations are necessarily different from developed, free-market countries. Studwell calls his model “the economics of learning”, noting that until nations have achieved a certain technological self-sufficiency, they cannot possibly succeed with a neo-classical economic model. An extract from the book is available here.

Asian Review of Books spoke with Studwell about the economics of learning and how Asia offers a new model for development.

 

ARB: How much research was involved in writing this? You’ve got very extensive footnotes—can you talk about where these ideas came from and how you developed them?

JS: I lived for ten years in China, and in that time I spent some time working in Southeast Asia as well. I arrived in China not speaking any Chinese. Most of the people who spend a long time in China become China people, but gradually I evolved into a person who was more interested in the comparative development of the major economies in East Asia. I focused on the major economies because it allows you to take the basket-case countries out of the equation and focus down.

In 2007-8, I did a Masters in Economics [Development Economics] and I started reading more into the economic literature, which is pretty strong on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in particular. In the era of the Cold War, the U.S. put a lot of resources behind stabilizing and supporting those economies. They were written about in the way that China’s being written about now. There’s actually a much stronger literature on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in terms of what happened than there is on any other country in the region, including China. There hasn’t really been a developmental classic about China yet. But if you take your knowledge of Southeast Asia and your access there, put that together with what has already been done about China, and bring the whole thing together, maybe that’s a useful project.

I also gave some thought to what the shortcomings are of the neo-classical view of economics that has dominated the world in an overwhelming way since the 1970s and 1980s.

ARB: It was clear in the book that you consider your theory is a deviation from the standard economic model. What can economists and development experts learn from this book? What is the standard economic view not seeing when it looks at Asia?

JS: The main message is about there being two kinds of economics. That really is a response to a question that was posed by Charles Kindleberger, who’s a very good economist, very historically literate. He posed the question: is it really possible that there is only one kind of economics?

The answer that I give in this book is that there are at least two. It has to do with objectives. Developmental objectives are about learning. It’s a learning process. Alexander Hamilton, the American treasury secretary back in the late 18th century, came up with the term “infant industry”. This theme of learning and likening it to the experience of going to school is one that people have often reached for as a way to explain what happens. Poor countries have the people, but they lack know-how and technology. When you start to think of learning as the objective, of course, that’s very different to when you’re thinking about short-term profit as the objective, or even efficiency.

What do we really mean by these terms? Well, efficiency could be short-term profitability. That isn’t necessarily the efficiency you’re looking for during a development period. The efficiency you’re looking for is how can we learn, or, in another respect, how can you go around the deficiencies of your human capital? Because people take such a long time to change. The economics of learning and development is largely about finding ways to go around human capital constraints.

You do that in agriculture if you use householdfarming, and turn it into gardening—because you’re just throwing the labor at the problem without a major restructuring. More than that, you’re employing all your human resources and getting something out of all your people. You do that in manufacturing by helping low-skilled people to build their knowledge base.

ARB: India is noticeably missing from this book, except for a mention that they have delved into IT and service-based industry rather than following the agriculture/manufacturing/finance model. Can you talk about why you didn’t include India here and how it differs?

JS: The media suggests sometimes that India has a different model and it’s based around services. I’m not sure that’s fair. I think it’s just that they don’t have a proper strategy. This is just the place they’ve ended up.

They have a very elitist education system left to them by the British. They have the Indian Institutes of Technology, and they graduate very sophisticated engineers, who work in IT and speak English. They work in software businesses, but in software, the capacity to absorb your human capital isn’t great. You can’t even write a single line of code until you’ve learned software code, whereas if you’re absorbing people into a manufacturing economy, you can put people in a factory and they can start to add a tiny bit of value from day one, because they’re working with and through machines.

This helps to explain why every developed country, with the exception of anomalous offshore financial centers (like Hong Kong and Singapore), everybody’s gone through this manufacturing experience. You can look at agricultural super-specialists like Australia and New Zealand, but even they have some manufacturing related to the agricultural sector.

ARB: Myanmar is kind of a blank slate at the moment. What’s going to happen there? Can they follow the model you’ve laid out?

JS: I don’t know what will happen in Myanmar, other than to say that the countries that develop are the ones that take control of their own destiny. If the government there says to the World Bank and the IMF, What’s on your shopping list?, they are going to end up with micro-finance and all kinds of at best superfluous and at worst damaging policy distractions. But if they do what successful states have done, which is to look at the world and see what other people have done, figure it out for themselves, and adjust it to their national condition, they’ll be fine.

The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] is easier to talk about. They have collectivized agriculture, so in the last decade or so they use a points system to differentiate people who work harder. They’ve brought the points-reward down to a very low level, a sub-group level, so they’re pretty close to rewarding the family as a unit. They could move very swiftly to household agriculture. If they were able to put the agronomic support in place around that, to make sure that farmers get the upside of growing more, then I could see, bizarrely, North Korea becoming the last fast-growing success story. It sounds extraordinary, but I can see that it’s possible they could turn on a dime.

ARB: In the book Japan emerges as a major success story developmentally, but one that failed to make an adjustment at some point and has stagnated as a result. Can you talk about that pivot point, where economies need to make a shift?

JS: This is most poorly understood part of the debate, including by me. Things are so misrepresented that one struggles just to communicate the idea of the economics of learning or development as distinct from the economics of efficiency that come later. Between these two things there is a relationship. The nature of that relationship is to do with the transition and the building of institutions, and it’s a very difficult thing to understand.

Take a legal system as an example. There’s a whole stream of literature that says property rights and a legal system are critical to economic development. Well, look at China. Does China have a functioning legal system? No. Has China developed? Yes, it has. But can China continue indefinitely to develop without a functioning legal system? I think not. Look at Italy!

The counter-example is South Korea. They got caught up in the Asian financial crisis largely through bond market interaction. Then the IMF went in, changed company law, changed the financial system, a bunch of stuff. Today, Korea appears to have the upside of developmental economics. It has its Samsung and Hyundai, very successful companies. Household indebtedness is still quite high, but maybe Korea gives us a window onto the relationship between these two kinds of economics and how one transitions from one to the other.

ARB: Also in China, manufacturing is big business, but industry expansion is causing serious environmental issues with economic and also social costs. At some point are these costs going to outweigh the benefits? How does the environment play into your model?

JS: In Japan and South Korea, they created one hell of a lot of pollution and then they cleaned it up. Why did they clean it up? Public pressure. By the late 60s in Japan people were getting very upset, and in Korea by the 80s. So government moved to clean that up.

In China we can see the beginnings of that as well. Such a high proportion of incidents of civil unrest are attributable in one way or another to poisonous rivers and air. In any situation you have to find the positive. China’s in a position to do that, because the world has been working on cleaner energy technologies and the size of the Chinese market means that they can push forward the development of those technologies—essentially, using the scale of the domestic market. They are incentivised to do it because they don’t have a lot of mineral resources—they have a lot of coal, but they can see down the road… [Environmental protection] won’t happen as fast as many people would like, but I suspect we are at the apex of dirtiness at this point.

 

Caitin Dwyer is a freelance writer. Her work has appeared in print and online throughout Asia and North America. Caitlin spent three years working and studying in China and has her Master of Journalism degree from the University of Hong Kong. She now lives in Oregon.

Irish Times

Elites behaving badly and other theories: why only some Asian states are ‘Tigers’

A new book offers some plausible explanations on the patchy rate of economic success across Asia

Clifford Coonan

Monday 1 July 2013

 

There’s a 500kg gorilla in the corner of the room when discussing Asia’s remarkable rise over the past few decades: why has the success has been so uneven?

JapanSouth Korea and Taiwan in the northeast have become fabulously wealthy while the Southeast Asian states, such as Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia have advanced, but at a far less impressive pace.

You hear some odd theories – the climate is too warm near the equator for these economies to thrive – which I’m sure is news to Hong Kong’s tycoons and their colleagues across the border in Guangdong.

Then there are cultural arguments put forward, that the Chinese or the Japanese are intrinsically hardworking. (I know plenty of lazy Chinese people, for the record, just like there are many lazy Germans.)

In How Asia WorksJoe Studwell goes a long way to cut through the cliches about Asian growth and explain why things have happened at a varied pace. If this is indeed to be the Asian Century, this engaging, thought-provoking book is required reading for anyone serious about understanding the structural dynamics of the continent.

Studwell says the blame is largely due to a lack of political leadership and a tendency by ruling elites to behave, well, badly. And for countries to do well, they have to be prepared to introduce land reform.
Success and failure
“No one had put this together before, a book covering the nine major economies, explaining the differences between the ones that succeeded and the ones that failed, and how in the end it came down to policies devised and implemented by human beings rather than anything else,” says Studwell in an interview.

He describes as “folly” the ways of the iconic leaders in the region in the past few decades, such as Mao in China, Sukarno in Indonesia and Mahathir in Malaysia, constantly railing against western hegemony and sticking “your rhetorical finger in the eye of its leader, the United States”.

“Far better to take a page out of [Korean leader] Park Chung-hee or contemporary China’s book: make public pronouncements about the importance of free markets, and then go quietly about your dirigiste business,” he writes.

One of the striking elements working in the region is the way in which countries like the Philippines, with its resources, its educated, often English-speaking workforce and its central geographical position have done much worse than countries such as Korea, which was devastated by war in living memory and has little in the way of natural resources to lift it, but has gone on to become one of the world’s richest economies.

“In east Asia the countries with the best endowments have pretty much done the worst. That’s why it’s such a fantastic laboratory for understanding economic development. People who had it all have thrown it all away, and the people who had less have gotten themselves organised and have done well,” said Studwell, who has written about the early days of the China boom in The China Dream and looked at tycoons in the region in Asian Godfathers.

“The main thing that prevents you from seeing that clearly in east Asia is the racial overlay. The rubbish you hear – largely generated by indigenous people in the region – about Chinese culture or Japanese culture, or Korean hard work versus . . . [people] down near the equator. It’s all just rubbish but it’s amazing how many people believe that stuff,” says Studwell.

“It’s been my observation at an entrepreneurial level as well. I’d never rate entrepreneurs that I met in China over the years higher than, say, entrepreneurs in places like Malaysia. They are not producing better businessmen,” he says.
Politics
Chinese business communities thrive in many areas of Southeast Asia, but this is down to political structures in the region.

“You find societies that settled into a feudal equilibrium. If you command political power, you command all power, and you can allow other people to come in and play the economic role. This is no different to the way feudal monarchs in western Europein the medieval and early modern period made use of Jewish financiers and it’s no different to the way Southeast Asian rulers made use of Persian and Arab traders before the Chinese were there,” he said.

He does not see much chance that the situation in Southeast Asia will change anytime soon.

There is no Konrad Adenauer equivalent to bring the countries in the region together as he did with the European Union core states in the 1950s.

“They found their equilibrium and it was one where the elites live pretty well. There just isn’t the political leadership. I don’t see a single politician down there who is going to change the trajectory of the region. Southeast Asia is the Latin America of east Asia, basically, and that is their political choice . . . they are relative economic failures though they have made significant economic advances since the end of the colonial period.”

Many of the Southeast Asian economies are former British colonies and Studwell talks of how the British empire was successful at marshalling structures in the region, and the long-term impact has been disastrous on many countries.

“The British empire in particular because it was so efficiently and subtly run, working with small numbers of people and working through local elites, it was extremely good at reinforcing and shoring up these kind of economic operating systems. This is why the colonial influence was so utterly perfidious.

“The British don’t come in and put a knife in your back, they finish you off with a warm embrace. They were fantastic at running systems on that basis which in developmental terms have proven to be enormously damaging.

“Malaysia doesn’t get independence until 1957 when the Cambridge University-educated leader of the country agrees to allow the British plantation and mining interests to remain in place and it was only the race riots in the 1960s which changed that,” he says.

“The same thing in the Philippines – independence in 1946 but the Americans locked them into various trade agreements which kept the ruling elites in a comfortable position.

“No country has ever acted generously having become rich, with the exception of theUnited States for a brief period after the second World War, in very particular circumstances.”
History of selfishness
He cites the remark by 19th century German economist Friedrich List about kicking away the ladder once you get to the top.

“That’s very much what Britain did. China fits much more into the British model. I don’t see them having a positive developmental impact in places like Africa, or inNorth Korea. The Chinese go in and trade for their own benefits. All that ‘pragmatic’ really means is that countries that climb the ladder of development have a very long history of being revoltingly selfish,” says Studwell.

So much is a question of approach. It’s not about prudence or stability, at least not necessarily.

“Macroeconomic stability was not a clear determinant of developmental success in northeast Asia, and nor was it in Southeast Asia, where there was also notable variation – for instance, between less ‘prudent’ Indonesia and more prudent Thailand, both of which ended up on the industrialisation rubbish heap,” he writes.

“Equally, there is the example of Ferdinand Marcos, who borrowed and printed lots of money like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in Korea, but blew his cash like a drunk in a casino.

“I think China will be the last fast growth story that we will see. You can’t have that kind of very fast development without land reform and I don’t think that kind of land reform is going to occur in Southeast Asia because the politicians can’t get it together.”

For those looking for a punt on a future growth story, Studwell recommends North Korea.

“The place most likely to have a 10 per cent growth story is North Korea. The reason would be is that Korean agriculture is collectivised but they have been moving tentatively towards household farming essentially and it wouldn’t require much of a push for North Korea to significantly increase its output and push to industrialisation and go for the east Asian miracle. It has the political infrastructure. It will of course require a political shift.”
How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region by Joe Studwell, Profile Books, £14.99

East coast US

Here are a first few links to lots of media stuff I did last week in the United States. I believe the book is officially available in north America from today. Certainly you can buy it on Amazon.com now, which many people were emailing to say was not possible in recent weeks.

Bloomberg TV. About 10 mins.

Bloomberg Radio. About 16 mins.

Florida Radio. A little bit more on US historical involvement in east Asia. About 21 minutes. Not sure this link is permanent — you have to click through to ’06/28/13 Joe Studwell’ — but it is working today.

Michigan Radio. 10 mins. This guy’s studied ignorance early on gets me just about irritated enough to focus down on some important points, in less than 10 mins.

Various from Asia

Just did three weeks in mainland China, Macau and Hong Kong. Here are some interviews:

FT’s Pilling on Indian IT after a chat.

Marginal Revolution likes the book. And is probably right that neither beach reader nor academic reader will be happy. There is a pretty informed discussion of the book by readers of the MR blog. Odd complaints are about insufficient elaboration on my part. Perhaps it should have been a 500 page book. But I decided not.

SCMP’s Tom Holland on the book.

Jake Van der Kamp responds to Tom Holland in the SCMP, except without reading the book. This is staggeringly lazy. File under Howard Davies. And I have often quite liked Van der Kamp’s stuff. But this thin, indolent drivel is a pretty good guide to why so many millions remain poor. How can anyone serious pass judgement on something they have not read? It is a book about stages, that takes in your view, Mr Van der Kamp, and the other one. Separately, and somewhat pedantically, ‘fulsome’ does not mean ‘full of’. It means ‘insincere’.

And now Holland responds. His main point is valid. I said at the beginning (and end) of How Asia Works that this is a book about economic development. Real development is also about social and political development. But I was not willing or capable to try to put the other parts of the equation in the same book. It would be too complex. And people would not absorb the basic message about economics. The next book will deal with the institutional stuff.

Hong Kong’s RTHK on the book. I had to download a plug-in to run this, but assume the average reader is more tech savvy than I. Trick is to do all this and then hit the play button to start the show. But first go to ‘Select segr’ and choose the 11.05 slot. With Phil Whelan. That is where the interview is. Very clunky stuff. But listenable if you get there.

Podcast interview by the Economist Intelligence Unit in Hong Kong.

Amcham in Beijing. The podcast should be here.

More to come when I remember what it was.

China Daily

Here’s the China Daily. One or two of the biographical details are wrong, and they made me a year younger than I am.

………………………………….

China the last big growth story

Updated: 2013-05-17 07:52

By Andrew Moody (China Daily)

Joe Studwell believes China might be the last emerging-nation economic success story the world sees for some time.

The leading Asian affairs author says it is wrong to assume that global development has somehow accelerated and that very soon everyone will soon enjoy Western standards of living.

“Everybody thinks the world is speeding up and after China it will be India and then it will be Africa. I don’t see this happening at all,” he says.

“China could be the last fast-growth story we see in the world.”

Studwell, former editor-in-chief of China Economic Quarterly, has set out his views in his latest book, How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region, which is already regarded as one of the major economic titles this year.

In it, he looks at why some Asian countries, such as South Korea and Japan as well as China, have had spectacular economic success and why others, such as the Philippines and Thailand, have not.

One of his central arguments is that it is not by applying free market principles that economies get rich. Instead, the basis for success has been agricultural development. China’s growth story, he argues, began when farmers became market gardeners in the late 1970s.

This gave it a platform for the country to become the manufacturing workshop of the world with the careful guidance of state planning, another Studwell ingredient for success.

“It (agricultural reform) is almost always overlooked. What have you got when you start? You have no capital. You have no technology. What you have got is that – as in any poor country – three-quarters of the population are farmers, and that is what you have got to work with.

China the last big growth story“If you ignore that part of the economy – as most developing economies do because they are run by people who live in cities – you have already shot yourself in the foot.”

Studwell says leaders of developing countries often ignore basic fundamentals when they address development issues.

He dismisses those in Africa who currently espouse the view the continent can ignore land reform and manufacturing and develop through retail or financial services.

“It is just rubbish but unfortunately there are people out there saying this. It is being endorsed to some extent by the multilateral agencies and the World Bank support for micro finance,” he says.

“Everybody (in Africa) buys a stall and starts selling each other sweeties or washing powder. If these sweeties and washing powder have been made by Unilever, where is this getting you?”

He argues that people are wrong also to see India’s development in the same light as China’s since it has not been based on land reform but on an IT revolution that has tended to benefit a middle class elite and not the majority farmer population.

“It is the liberation of the posh Indian. It is a facetious thing to say but it is not far from the truth. If you have been to one of the Indian institutes of technology everything is fine and dandy. If you are a landless peasant in Bihar, you are still a landless peasant.”

Studwell, who speaks Chinese as well as Spanish and Italian, almost stumbled into a China connection.

After getting a first in modern history at Bristol University, he spent most of the 1980s as a freelance journalist for the Observer and the Evening Standard. His wife, who had studied Chinese at Cambridge, suddenly said she wanted to go and live in China.

The move led to him eventually becoming founder and editor of China Economic Quarterly, which is published by Dragonomics, the macroeconomics research firm of which he was also co-founder.

His big breakthrough came in 2007 with the publication of his second book, Asian Godfathers: Money and Power in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, which was listed by both BusinessWeek and Wall Street Journal Asia as one of the top 10 business books of the year.

How Asia Works has had a similarly good reception, having been described by the Financial Times as an “important book” that should make people “rethink the glib equation of free-market policies with economic success”.

Studwell argues in the book that agricultural reform has been central to all the Asian economic success stories, starting with Japan in the 19th century.

“Japan led the way in the late 19th century with probably the most radical land reform that had been done anywhere in the world at that point,” he says.

He argues that the problem with countries like the Philippines is that they only pay lip service to the idea.

“The Philippines still has a comprehensive agriculture reform law in force. They just prolong the thing indefinitely. It has been running for 25 years. It is something you need to do in six months and get on with it,” he says.

Studwell insists another essential ingredient of economic success in Asia has been protecting nascent industries and not exposing them to international competition.

He insists both South Korea and China have been particularly successful at doing this.

“The analogy that works best is like the education process of a child and it should not be taken in a patronizing way,” he says.

“When you don’t understand technology, you don’t know about it, you have to learn. What Deng (Xiaoping) said when he came to power was that China had to accept it was a backward country. It took enormous political courage to say something like that.”

As for China, Studwell believes there is too much of a tendency to see the country’s progress over the past 30 years as the easy period of its development process with the next 30 years seen as more challenging.

“I wouldn’t say it was easy at all. It has been a huge achievement.”

Although he argues that China needs to make further serious reforms including the opening-up of its capital markets, he also says that the country is not at some urgent crossroads yet.

“My expectation is that growth of 7 to 8 percent can continue for another decade and with this sort of momentum, the middle class would be happy with rising incomes, although they will become increasingly frustrated by some of the institutional failures,” he says.

“China is not going to collapse if it doesn’t do much over the next 10 years, but if they don’t do much, the country’s potential will be greatly reduced.”