Here is a review of How Asia Works by the venerable Jonathan Fenby. I only have a PDF, so you will have to read it as a download. Click on the link below.
Boom and bust in Asia
Going for growth
Explaining Asia’s economic success is as easy as one, two, three
IN 1989 John Williamson, a British economist in Washington, DC, listed ten economic policies that enjoyed the backing of the IMF, the World Bank and many of their clients in Latin America. Whatever the merits of these policies, the “Washington consensus”, as he called it, proved badly named. Its prescriptions—stabilise, privatise and liberalise—have caused no end of controversy. Almost 25 years later, they get another drubbing in Joe Studwell’s provocative new book, “How Asia Works”.
Mr Studwell has no such inhibitions. Asia’s post-war miracle economies emerged, he argues, by following a recipe with just three ingredients: land reform; export-led, state-backed manufacturing; and financial repression.
The process began with the ousting of the landlords. Feudal estates were broken up and divided among small farmers, who also received cheap credit and valuable advice. Smallholder farming requires “grotesque” amounts of labour, Mr Studwell concedes. But that is a good thing, because countries as poor as Taiwan or South Korea were in the 1950s have labour—and only labour—in abundance.
Tightly planted, closely tended farms coax the best yields out of each parcel of land. This rural bounty then creates room for the next step: export-led manufacturing. The state, Mr Studwell argues, must nurse manufacturers through their infancy, helping them to learn how to stand on their own feet. This nurture should, however, be combined with discipline: the state must oblige firms to export. Foreign sales provide an external test of their progress, allowing the state to “cull losers”, even if it cannot pick winners.
The final secret of Asian success, Mr Studwell argues, was a cowed financial system. Captive savers, penned in by capital controls, were ripped off by the banks, which paid low interest rates. This allowed the banks to subsidise industrial firms through their years of education.
Mr Studwell’s recipe is not original: the formula dates back at least 140 years, he shows, to Japan under the Meiji emperor. Only the first step, smallholder farming, would be backed by this newspaper. But “How Asia Works” is a striking and enlightening book, which reflects the author’s unusual career. Having worked as an analyst (for the Economist Intelligence Unit, our sister company) and a consultant, he wrote books on China’s seduction of foreign businessmen and Asia’s crony capitalists. Then he went back to school, embarking on a doctorate at Cambridge, home to a number of unorthodox economists.
The result is a lively mix of scholarship, reporting and polemic. Its heart is a historical account of how smallholder farming, export-led manufacturing and financial repression took root in Asia’s miracle economies, such as Japan and Taiwan, but failed to bed down in the Philippines and Indonesia. This is punctuated by travelogues, describing Asia’s landscape of economic triumph and tribulation, from the kitsch houses of rice farmers in Japan’s Niigata prefecture, who have great agricultural know-how but little architectural taste, to the unfinished towers of Jakarta’s Bank Alley, their growth stunted by the Asian financial crisis.
The most impressive part of the book is the 68 pages of footnotes in which Mr Studwell dips into his trove of reading and reporting. He includes observations on Javanese chickens, the sex life of a Korean chaebol-founder, the constitutional rules that Meiji-era Japan copied from Prussia and his exchanges with Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s former strongman.
In these notes, Mr Studwell wanders into the weeds of development (quite literally: Japanese rice is weeded nine times a year, he writes). But he never gets lost. The three-step doctrine he advocates is even shorter than the ten-step Washington consensus he opposes. But it will no doubt prove similarly controversial.
An Interview with Joe Studwell, author of How Asia Works
How Asia Works; Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region
Profile Books Ltd, March 2013
3 July 2013 — Joe Studwell has written about Asia and economics for a variety of publications. Founding editor of China Economic Quarterly, he is also the author of three books: The China Dream, Asian Godfathers, and his most recent, How Asia Works.
How Asia Works seeks to debunk the classical rationale for why some Asian countries have flourished economically and others not. Three factors—agriculture, manufacturing, and finance—need supportive government policy to encourage development, Studwell posits. Using examples from Malaysia, Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines, Studwell shows that the economics of developing nations are necessarily different from developed, free-market countries. Studwell calls his model “the economics of learning”, noting that until nations have achieved a certain technological self-sufficiency, they cannot possibly succeed with a neo-classical economic model. An extract from the book is available here.
Asian Review of Books spoke with Studwell about the economics of learning and how Asia offers a new model for development.
ARB: How much research was involved in writing this? You’ve got very extensive footnotes—can you talk about where these ideas came from and how you developed them?
JS: I lived for ten years in China, and in that time I spent some time working in Southeast Asia as well. I arrived in China not speaking any Chinese. Most of the people who spend a long time in China become China people, but gradually I evolved into a person who was more interested in the comparative development of the major economies in East Asia. I focused on the major economies because it allows you to take the basket-case countries out of the equation and focus down.
In 2007-8, I did a Masters in Economics [Development Economics] and I started reading more into the economic literature, which is pretty strong on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in particular. In the era of the Cold War, the U.S. put a lot of resources behind stabilizing and supporting those economies. They were written about in the way that China’s being written about now. There’s actually a much stronger literature on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in terms of what happened than there is on any other country in the region, including China. There hasn’t really been a developmental classic about China yet. But if you take your knowledge of Southeast Asia and your access there, put that together with what has already been done about China, and bring the whole thing together, maybe that’s a useful project.
I also gave some thought to what the shortcomings are of the neo-classical view of economics that has dominated the world in an overwhelming way since the 1970s and 1980s.
ARB: It was clear in the book that you consider your theory is a deviation from the standard economic model. What can economists and development experts learn from this book? What is the standard economic view not seeing when it looks at Asia?
JS: The main message is about there being two kinds of economics. That really is a response to a question that was posed by Charles Kindleberger, who’s a very good economist, very historically literate. He posed the question: is it really possible that there is only one kind of economics?
The answer that I give in this book is that there are at least two. It has to do with objectives. Developmental objectives are about learning. It’s a learning process. Alexander Hamilton, the American treasury secretary back in the late 18th century, came up with the term “infant industry”. This theme of learning and likening it to the experience of going to school is one that people have often reached for as a way to explain what happens. Poor countries have the people, but they lack know-how and technology. When you start to think of learning as the objective, of course, that’s very different to when you’re thinking about short-term profit as the objective, or even efficiency.
What do we really mean by these terms? Well, efficiency could be short-term profitability. That isn’t necessarily the efficiency you’re looking for during a development period. The efficiency you’re looking for is how can we learn, or, in another respect, how can you go around the deficiencies of your human capital? Because people take such a long time to change. The economics of learning and development is largely about finding ways to go around human capital constraints.
You do that in agriculture if you use householdfarming, and turn it into gardening—because you’re just throwing the labor at the problem without a major restructuring. More than that, you’re employing all your human resources and getting something out of all your people. You do that in manufacturing by helping low-skilled people to build their knowledge base.
ARB: India is noticeably missing from this book, except for a mention that they have delved into IT and service-based industry rather than following the agriculture/manufacturing/finance model. Can you talk about why you didn’t include India here and how it differs?
JS: The media suggests sometimes that India has a different model and it’s based around services. I’m not sure that’s fair. I think it’s just that they don’t have a proper strategy. This is just the place they’ve ended up.
They have a very elitist education system left to them by the British. They have the Indian Institutes of Technology, and they graduate very sophisticated engineers, who work in IT and speak English. They work in software businesses, but in software, the capacity to absorb your human capital isn’t great. You can’t even write a single line of code until you’ve learned software code, whereas if you’re absorbing people into a manufacturing economy, you can put people in a factory and they can start to add a tiny bit of value from day one, because they’re working with and through machines.
This helps to explain why every developed country, with the exception of anomalous offshore financial centers (like Hong Kong and Singapore), everybody’s gone through this manufacturing experience. You can look at agricultural super-specialists like Australia and New Zealand, but even they have some manufacturing related to the agricultural sector.
ARB: Myanmar is kind of a blank slate at the moment. What’s going to happen there? Can they follow the model you’ve laid out?
JS: I don’t know what will happen in Myanmar, other than to say that the countries that develop are the ones that take control of their own destiny. If the government there says to the World Bank and the IMF, What’s on your shopping list?, they are going to end up with micro-finance and all kinds of at best superfluous and at worst damaging policy distractions. But if they do what successful states have done, which is to look at the world and see what other people have done, figure it out for themselves, and adjust it to their national condition, they’ll be fine.
The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] is easier to talk about. They have collectivized agriculture, so in the last decade or so they use a points system to differentiate people who work harder. They’ve brought the points-reward down to a very low level, a sub-group level, so they’re pretty close to rewarding the family as a unit. They could move very swiftly to household agriculture. If they were able to put the agronomic support in place around that, to make sure that farmers get the upside of growing more, then I could see, bizarrely, North Korea becoming the last fast-growing success story. It sounds extraordinary, but I can see that it’s possible they could turn on a dime.
ARB: In the book Japan emerges as a major success story developmentally, but one that failed to make an adjustment at some point and has stagnated as a result. Can you talk about that pivot point, where economies need to make a shift?
JS: This is most poorly understood part of the debate, including by me. Things are so misrepresented that one struggles just to communicate the idea of the economics of learning or development as distinct from the economics of efficiency that come later. Between these two things there is a relationship. The nature of that relationship is to do with the transition and the building of institutions, and it’s a very difficult thing to understand.
Take a legal system as an example. There’s a whole stream of literature that says property rights and a legal system are critical to economic development. Well, look at China. Does China have a functioning legal system? No. Has China developed? Yes, it has. But can China continue indefinitely to develop without a functioning legal system? I think not. Look at Italy!
The counter-example is South Korea. They got caught up in the Asian financial crisis largely through bond market interaction. Then the IMF went in, changed company law, changed the financial system, a bunch of stuff. Today, Korea appears to have the upside of developmental economics. It has its Samsung and Hyundai, very successful companies. Household indebtedness is still quite high, but maybe Korea gives us a window onto the relationship between these two kinds of economics and how one transitions from one to the other.
ARB: Also in China, manufacturing is big business, but industry expansion is causing serious environmental issues with economic and also social costs. At some point are these costs going to outweigh the benefits? How does the environment play into your model?
JS: In Japan and South Korea, they created one hell of a lot of pollution and then they cleaned it up. Why did they clean it up? Public pressure. By the late 60s in Japan people were getting very upset, and in Korea by the 80s. So government moved to clean that up.
In China we can see the beginnings of that as well. Such a high proportion of incidents of civil unrest are attributable in one way or another to poisonous rivers and air. In any situation you have to find the positive. China’s in a position to do that, because the world has been working on cleaner energy technologies and the size of the Chinese market means that they can push forward the development of those technologies—essentially, using the scale of the domestic market. They are incentivised to do it because they don’t have a lot of mineral resources—they have a lot of coal, but they can see down the road… [Environmental protection] won’t happen as fast as many people would like, but I suspect we are at the apex of dirtiness at this point.
Caitin Dwyer is a freelance writer. Her work has appeared in print and online throughout Asia and North America. Caitlin spent three years working and studying in China and has her Master of Journalism degree from the University of Hong Kong. She now lives in Oregon.
Here is the Wall Street Journal we know and love. Most obvious observation is that the reviewer has not read the back end of the book. Otherwise he wouldn’t have set me up as an ‘attacker’ of neo-classical economics in the way he does.
His best effort at a substantive riposte is in this par:
<Mr. Studwell also underestimates the capital formation undone by land reforms. He dutifully reports that, for instance, under Japanese rule before 1945 Taiwan had enjoyed significant investment in yield-boosting technologies in the countryside. But he seems strangely uncurious about why earlier land regimes around the region had experienced deteriorating levels of investment in agriculture, a line of inquiry that might have suggested less drastic alternatives to the policies the tigers ended up following. Onerous agricultural taxes and murky protections of property rights were often to blame for stunted rural capital accumulation.>
But there is nothing really there. Just a bit of fantasy about low taxes and property rights being the solution to any given problem. (A bit like the less thoughtful Republican view of the current US malaise.)
I guess Rupert Murdoch will be happy enough. And I’m not much fussed.
Don’t Think Of A Tiger
by Joseph Sternberg
Readers of a certain age will remember when Japan was going to eat the world’s lunch. These days, we gird ourselves for a “Chinese century,” while awarding an honorable mention to those scrappy South Koreans every time we buy a Samsung phone or a Hyundai. The successes of these so-called tiger economies, which also include Taiwan, fascinate economists and policy makers.
Joe Studwell attempts a concise explanation of the Asian miracle in “How Asia Works,” and his book comes across as a how-to of sorts: Make Your Own Economic Miracle in Just Three Steps. First, reform agricultural land ownership to encourage small-plot, high-yield farming. Next, implement industrial policies to nurture infant industries and impose discipline on exporters to up their competitive games by requiring companies to export to foreign markets where they will face more intense competition. Finally, deploy the financial system in support of items one and two, steering capital to exporters.
Japan charted the course that others followed. As far back as the 1860s, the government pensioned off the class of powerful landlords known as daimyo in order to redistribute their land to smallholders who had previously been tenant farmers. South Korea followed suit in the late 1940s and ’50s, as did Taiwan (with an assist from the Americans). At least those reforms were relatively peaceful, and some attempt was made to compensate displaced landlords. China achieved the same result but with greater violence during the first years of communist rule. This actually boosted productivity dramatically in the early 1950s, until Mao Zedong succumbed to the siren song of collectivization less than a decade later.
Then came manufacturing. Mr. Studwell notes that the goal across the tiger economies was to protect national champions at home while forcing them to be competitive abroad. Exports provided a source of capital and exposed companies to cutting-edge technologies in developed markets instead of allowing them to retreat into uncompetitive, high-profit domestic markets. In Japan and Korea a system of incentives rewarded companies for export success in competitive global markets, for instance by making capital available only to those companies that boosted market share abroad. Yet in other countries, such as Malaysia, protectionism simply allowed companies to profit at home without ever making much of a push abroad.
How Asia Works
By Joe Studwell
(Grove, 366 pages, $27)
This is where Mr. Studwell’s third prong comes in, since the financial system was often the preferred tool for implementing such rewards. Companies who notched export successes would enjoy preferential access to capital; others wouldn’t. By suppressing interest rates paid to savers to enable lower lending rates for manufacturers (a technique known as financial repression), Asian governments could redirect capital toward industry and, in the process, reward certain kinds of industry. Chinese banks do the same today.
Mr. Studwell, whose earlier works include “Asian Godfathers,” on the continent’s new tycoons, here delivers a readable survey of the growth policies pursued in the tiger economies and also offers some helpful analysis of why similar strategies failed in Southeast Asia. He notes, correctly, that leaders there never had sufficient political determination to impose such draconian policies. If he had stopped there, this would be a serviceable if rather incomplete book. But his ambition is to undermine “neo-classical ‘efficiency’ economics” by demonstrating that the more illiberal policies of the tigers were superior in achieving development. This is a serious misreading of the Asian story.
For one, the policies Mr. Studwell commends have been far costlier than he admits. He glosses over the hundreds of thousands or even millions of Chinese who died as a result of pre-Great Leap Forward land redistribution. Mr. Studwell also underestimates the capital formation undone by land reforms. He dutifully reports that, for instance, under Japanese rule before 1945 Taiwan had enjoyed significant investment in yield-boosting technologies in the countryside. But he seems strangely uncurious about why earlier land regimes around the region had experienced deteriorating levels of investment in agriculture, a line of inquiry that might have suggested less drastic alternatives to the policies the tigers ended up following. Onerous agricultural taxes and murky protections of property rights were often to blame for stunted rural capital accumulation.
Likewise, he plays down the costs of tiger-style industrial and financial reforms. Here, the basic principle was simpler than Mr. Studwell makes it out to be: force people to pay more for things. The combination of import-protectionism and financial repression engineered a sustained wealth transfer from households to exporting companies, in order to facilitate investment. This undeniably leads to rapid GDP growth, at least for a spell. But is it fair to tell poor citizens of low-income countries to sacrifice their preferred level of consumption today for some “optimal” level of growth tomorrow? Might it be better to open up to imports, thereby allowing citizens to benefit from the resulting competition?
Asians are answering these questions themselves. In South Korea, “economic democratization” is now a buzzword that at its best means removing industrial supports for exporters in favor of creating a more competitive domestic market. In Japan, many of Shinzo Abe’s reforms—such as joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks to reduce barriers to imports—would lower consumer prices and foster competition at home. Chinese leaders say they seek the same, although their willpower is in doubt.
Meanwhile, countries like Indonesia and the Philippines are belatedly experiencing growth spurts fueled in large part by domestic consumption, and India continues a piecemeal liberalization with similar effects. Free trade played a key role in Asia’s development story. But as Mr. Studwell shows so clearly, true liberalism has never been attempted by any nation in the region. Before concluding that the tiger way, for all its costs, is the best path for Asia, it might be worth awaiting the results of an experiment in a more liberal alternative that is only now beginning.
Mr. Sternberg is an editorial-page writer with The Wall Street Journal Asia, where he edits the Business Asia column.
Here are a first few links to lots of media stuff I did last week in the United States. I believe the book is officially available in north America from today. Certainly you can buy it on Amazon.com now, which many people were emailing to say was not possible in recent weeks.
Bloomberg TV. About 10 mins.
Bloomberg Radio. About 16 mins.
Florida Radio. A little bit more on US historical involvement in east Asia. About 21 minutes. Not sure this link is permanent — you have to click through to ’06/28/13 Joe Studwell’ — but it is working today.
Michigan Radio. 10 mins. This guy’s studied ignorance early on gets me just about irritated enough to focus down on some important points, in less than 10 mins.
Just did three weeks in mainland China, Macau and Hong Kong. Here are some interviews:
FT’s Pilling on Indian IT after a chat.
Marginal Revolution likes the book. And is probably right that neither beach reader nor academic reader will be happy. There is a pretty informed discussion of the book by readers of the MR blog. Odd complaints are about insufficient elaboration on my part. Perhaps it should have been a 500 page book. But I decided not.
SCMP’s Tom Holland on the book.
Jake Van der Kamp responds to Tom Holland in the SCMP, except without reading the book. This is staggeringly lazy. File under Howard Davies. And I have often quite liked Van der Kamp’s stuff. But this thin, indolent drivel is a pretty good guide to why so many millions remain poor. How can anyone serious pass judgement on something they have not read? It is a book about stages, that takes in your view, Mr Van der Kamp, and the other one. Separately, and somewhat pedantically, ‘fulsome’ does not mean ‘full of’. It means ‘insincere’.
And now Holland responds. His main point is valid. I said at the beginning (and end) of How Asia Works that this is a book about economic development. Real development is also about social and political development. But I was not willing or capable to try to put the other parts of the equation in the same book. It would be too complex. And people would not absorb the basic message about economics. The next book will deal with the institutional stuff.
Hong Kong’s RTHK on the book. I had to download a plug-in to run this, but assume the average reader is more tech savvy than I. Trick is to do all this and then hit the play button to start the show. But first go to ‘Select segr’ and choose the 11.05 slot. With Phil Whelan. That is where the interview is. Very clunky stuff. But listenable if you get there.
Podcast interview by the Economist Intelligence Unit in Hong Kong.
Amcham in Beijing. The podcast should be here.
More to come when I remember what it was.
Here is a review of both How Asia Works and Acemoglu/Robinson’s Why Nations Fail (which for me has some good stuff in it but fails to recognise that there are distinct ‘stages’ to economic development) from the UK’s Future of Business blog.
Why emerging economies are starting to fail and what might prevent it.
There’s increasing anxiety that many of the emerging economies, even in places like Asia, are failing to perform as consistently as we once thought they might. Even some of the BRICS countries – until recently seen as the stars of the emerging world – have recently been reprimanded for their shortcomings, while Argentina – no stranger to economic catastrophe, of course – has attracted the attention of the IMF over its statistics and expectations about Africa, which only a few months ago often seemed quite bullish, have cooled in certain places.
So what explains the variations in economic attainment between different parts of the region? Two new books shed insight on this issue.
The first, “How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region” (Profile Books) is a hefty tome – as befits a work by somebody who has researched the subject as deeply as author Joe Studwell. But his explanation about what underpins Asia’s success is really quite simple – as basic as one, two, three. In effect, there are three fundamental interventions by governments that make a real difference in these regions.
- The most overlooked, says Studwell, is to maximize output from agriculture, which employs the vast majority of people in developing countries. Essentially larger-scale farming, this makes use of all available labour and creates the produce surpluses that in turn lead to demand for goods and services. As such, it proves more effective at getting countries on the development road than the drive towards mechanisation and other efficiencies associated with developed economies.
- Direct investment and entrepreneurs towards manufacturing on the grounds that this work is most suited to workers first moving away from agriculture. Allied to this is a government focus on export through subsidies designed to promote technological upgrading.
- There are financial interventions focusing capital on these two sectors. The idea is to keep money targeted as a development strategy aimed at producing the fastest possible technological learning and hence the promise of high future profits, says Studwell.
He accepts that such policies do not tend to find favour with either many businesses or consumers, both of which tend to think in a more short-term way. Perhaps more significantly, such an analysis pits Studwell – as he freely admits – against the received wisdom of the World Bank, the IMF and many western governments, which have for years argued that “laissez-faire” policies have been central to economic growth. Such institutions point to the success of Hong Kong and Singapore on the one hand and the speedy growth of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand on the other as evidence.
Are emerging economies failing?
But Studwell counters that the first two are more offshore centres than conventional countries, while the other three have not seen their development sustained. By contrast, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China have more or less followed the model set out above and so outperformed many neighboring countries. And confounded the so-called experts into the bargain.
This issue of how countries can continue to struggle in spite of huge amounts of attention from economists and other specialists and in the face of the much-vaunted “flattening” of the world through globalization is the subject of another recent book from Profile – “Why Nations Fail” by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson.
As the authors acknowledge, there is much discussion of the roles played by climate and geography in poverty and prosperity. Certainly, it is true that there are a lot of poor countries in sub-Sahara Africa, for example. But then, as they point out, the climate and geography of North Korea are not that different from those in South Korea, while there is a great difference between the prosperity of Arizona and northern Mexico but not much difference in weather or terrain.
Another often-offered explanation for the discrepancy is ignorance – in the sense that certain countries do not know which policies to adopt. Quite apart from the sensitivities of such a suggestion, this is not grounded in experience, say Acemoglu and Robinson. In fact, they assert that there is no shortage of advice and the leaders of many countries “get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose.” They go on to say that understanding this requires studying how decisions “actually get made, who gets to make them, and why those people decide to do what they do”. This, they add, is the study of politics and political processes – something that economics has traditionally ignored.
In his book Studwell describes how countries such as South Korea have subverted the current enthusiasm for free markets by talking the language while quietly getting on with the industrial strategies so opposed by Western governments. Never mind that these same governments have not always been adverse to a bit of intervention themselves. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that Britain and the United States and other developed economies owe a lot of their strength to extensive use in the past of that most obvious of state interventions, protectionism.
Rich nations, poor policies
The Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has pointed out that insisting that developing countries adopt large-scale trade liberalization as advocated by free-trade economists is akin to him forcing his young son into the labour market at an early age rather than educating him and otherwise nurturing him. As he writes in an article for the Independent newspaper (23 July 2007), based on his book “Bad Samaritans – Rich Nations, Poor Policies, and the Threat to the Developing World” (Random House), “industries in developing countries should be sheltered from superior foreign producers before they ‘grow up’. They need to be given protection, subsidies and other help while they master advanced technologies and build effective organizations”.
The phrase “effective organizations” is perhaps key to what is known as the infant industry argument. A central theme pursued by Acemoglu and Robinson is that nations fail because they are run by extractive political institutions. All over the world – from Africa to Asia and many places in between (the pre-Civil Rights southern United States is a classic case) – narrow elites have run things for their own benefit to the exclusion of the vast majority.
As recent events in the Middle East have shown, even holding elections – another activity much favoured by western developed countries – cannot necessarily break the cycle. Acemoglu and Robinson point out that a free media and developments in communications technology can help at the margins. But what really needs to happen is that a broad section of society mobilizes to create real political change. This means swapping extractive institutions for more inclusive ones, rather than – as often happens in revolutions – a simple change of control in the extractive institutions. In other words, creating prosperity can be as much about politics as economics.
A sense of history – something else said to be somewhat lacking in the modern study of economics – might also help. Just as some are calling for a relaxing of the austerity programmes in developed countries, partly on the grounds of questions over the intellectual underpinning for them, so it might be worth looking at whether there might be benefits for all in shifting away from the conviction that developing countries need to rush to adopt the free-trade policies so beloved of western policymakers. Certain economic issues are just too important to be left to economists.